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1 Introduction 
In social health insurance systems all over the world, the concept of managed competition may be ill-
defined, but surely does attract a lot of attention.4 Countries as culturally and institutionally diverse as 
Colombia and Israel reorganize their health care systems aiming for more market incentives and 
more responsibilities for market actors. In this article however, we focus on two neighboring countries 
in the heart of Europe. Both the Netherlands and Germany have a long tradition of comprehensive 
social health insurance systems and many similar institutional characteristics (Lieverdink/van der Made 
1996). Both countries highly value broad access to health care and critically assess the effects of 
changes in the financing schemes with regard to income distribution. Both systems are mainly 
financed by premiums not dependent on individual risk but on individual income. In both countries, 
the health care system is characterized by a mix of predominantly public funding and private provision 
of health care services. At the same time, both health care systems are to a large extent regulated by 
central and regional governments. This regulation extends from the budgeting of sickness funds and 
providers to the regulation of prices and capacities. Both governments try to curb costs for health care 
while at the same time technological progress and demographic changes increase the pressure on 
health care costs.  
In the 1990s the concept of Managed competition - defined as a system allowing competing health 
insurance agencies to selectively contract providers on behalf of their insured, under narrowly defined 
rules set by government - seemed to be an innovative approach for both countries in order to curb 
costs, increase efficiency and effectiveness of the system and maintain high standards of equity. 
Based on the recommendations of the 1987 Dekker-Committee, the Dutch government has 
implemented several instruments and incentives of the managed competition model since the late 
1980s and the early 1990s (Robinson 1998; Okma 1999). This approach has been dubbed as “…not 
only a theoretically elegant blueprint of an equitable and efficient health care system but also an 
ingenious political compromise (Schut 1995b: 638).” Only a few years later the German government 
reorganized the health care system by introducing competitive elements (Wysong/Abel 1996; Freeman 
1998). In both countries reforms aiming for more consistent incentives and instruments in the health 
care system are still ranking high on the political agenda (Henke 1999; Schut/van Doorslaer 1999).  
The central questions this paper seeks to address are: first, what are the main underlying claims and 
assumptions of Enthoven´s model of managed competition (the MC model), and second, under what 
conditions can the model work in the context of the social insurance systems of Western Europe? 
The paper approaches these questions both theoretically and empirically. First, it analyzes the 
theoretical qualities of the model by applying economic theories as well as models of public policy. 
Second, it looks at empirical evidence by studying the results of the application of a variant of the 
                                                        
4 As Ted Marmor observes (Marmor/Maynard 1994) the very term managed competition is somewhat oxymoronic.  
Competition requires the freedom of actors to negotiate about prices and volumes of their goods and services, 
whereas regulation seeks to restrain that freedom.   4 
model in the Dutch health care system (the adjusted MC model). The first stage of the analysis 
concludes that at first sight, the model of managed competition provides an elegant solution for the 
problem of the trade off between solidarity and universal access to health services on the one hand, 
and the need for increased efficiency on the other hand. But a closer look reveals both important 
internal inconsistencies and theoretical deficiencies of Enthoven´s MC model. Further, the paper 
argues that the conditions and policy context of the Dutch and German health care systems 
substantially differ from the context of the private health insurance in the U.S. in which Enthoven 
framed his original proposals for managed competition. Those theoretical findings lead to a reframing 
of the model itself. 
In spite of the seeming popularity of the managed competition model, its economic foundation and 
the foundation of economic competition it is based on is underdeveloped in literature as well in public 
discussion. In the first part of this article, we analyze the functions of competition in economic theory, 
of the proposed functions of the managed competition model and the behavioral assumptions implicit 
in that model. Next, the paper presents empirical evidence of the Dutch experience with the adjusted 
form of managed competition based on the recommendations of the 1987 Dekker advisory 
committee. The paper concludes that in its first years of implementation, this adjusted MC model has 
not been very successful.  
However, before calling a final verdict two specific questions arise: first, did managed competition fail 
because it is altogether unsuitable for application in health care; and (or) second, did the model fail to 
produce results because of its incomplete application? To the first question we conclude that there 
are too many barriers to expect the model to work. As Arrow already observed in 1963, the very 
characteristics of demand and supply in health care preclude the markets in health care from 
providing an efficient and fair exchange based on full competition (asymmetric information, external 
effects, risk selection, self selection, moral hazard). In order to compensate for such deficiencies, 
there is need for government regulation to such extend that in fact, the rules of the market have 
shifted to the rules of social insurance. This difference is crucial when discussing the roles and 
expected behavior of the participating actors. For example, risk rating and risk selection are perfectly 
normal activities of private health insurance, but highly undesirable in social insurance where one of 
the main goals is to provide universal access to health care and hence, to safeguard access to health 
insurance for all. Acknowledging such problems, the Dekker advisory committee had framed its 
proposals in the framework of social insurance, imposing mandatory participation for all, prohibiting 
risk selection and risk rated premiums. Once such basic requirements were in place, the committee 
concluded that competitive incentives might help in improving the quality and efficiency of the Dutch 
health care system, but that the impact of competition need to be mitigated by strict government 
control and monitoring.  
The second question is whether the disappointing results were due to incomplete implementation of 
the adjusted MC model. Our conclusion, based on findings of major behavioral changes in other parts 
of the Dutch health care systems, is confirmative. But the adjusted model also has to adjust its 5 
expectations to a more realistic level. The measure of its success is not only whether there is an 
increase in efficiency but also, whether it can gain enough support by the major stakeholders in 
health care to keep it working in the longer term. This requires careful analysis of the position of, and 
the relations between, those stakeholders. 
 
2  Economic Foundation of the Managed Competition Model 
Our approach towards describing the economic foundation of the managed competition model starts 
by analyzing the mechanisms and functions economic theory throughout history has ascribed to 
competition. After that, we outline functions, behavioral assumptions, incentives and instruments of 
the managed competition model. 
2.1 Competition in Economic Theory 
“There is probably no concept in all of economics that is at once more fundamental and pervasive, yet 
less satisfactorily developed, than the concept of competition ... a principle so basic to economic 
reasoning that not even such powerful yet diverse critics of orthodox theory as Marx and Keynes could 
avoid relying upon it - without ever clearly specifying what, exactly, competition is (McNulty 1968: 639).“ 
The citation above points to a severe problem with regard to competition in economic theory. Until the 
early 20th century, there was no such thing as a theory of competition. Functions and mechanisms of 
competition were embedded within prevalent economic theory. However, it is possible to identify 
several central mechanisms and functions of competition. It is important to note that stated aims of 
competition vary quite substantially over time. 
Competition itself is probably as old as human history,5 but the first economist who integrated 
competition and economic theory was Adam Smith in the 18th century. Within classical economic 
theory, competition becomes a conditio sine qua non for the organization of society. According to this 
theory, the force of competition regulates demand and supply. Thus, not only prices within one 
market gravitate around the natural price. This is also true for the allocation of resources between 
different markets. Competition is described as a process of action and reaction toward some kind of 
equilibrium and provides economic order and stability (Smith 1976/1776). Metaphorically speaking, 
competition is as central to classical economic theory as the force of gravity to physics. 
Classical economic theory and its implicit analysis of competition has been challenged by 
neoclassical economic theory in the late 19th century. This theory frames central assumptions for 
                                                        
5 Although it is probably more adequate to talk of rivalry in order to define competition as a purely economic concept. 6 
demand and supply reaching equilibrium with an optimal amount of social welfare.6 These 
assumptions include optimal rationality of market actors, full mobility of resources and independent 
actions of market actors. It is important to note that neoclassical economic theory does not explicitly 
explain functions and mechanisms of competition. It more or less assumes that allocative efficiency 
and a stationary equilibrium will be realized under the above assumptions and conditions of perfect 
competition. Thus, perfect competition is one of the prerequisites for highest social welfare (Marshall 
1890). It should be obvious that this approach is a powerful analytical tool in order to analyze different 
states of utility, but that it is not very helpful to analyze competition as a dynamic force. 
This is the reason for the establishment of competition theory as a more or less autonomous branch 
within economic theory. In order to explain the development of innovation, elements of monopoly 
have been re-integrated, since empirical evidence has shown imperfect competition to be the rule 
rather than an exception (Robinson 1954).  According to this approach, innovative entrepreneurs 
should be able to reap monopolistic profits for a limited period of time in order to reward them for the 
risk to introduce new products and new production techniques. Competition does ensure that after an 
adequate amount of time has passed, other entrepreneurs imitate the innovations or introduce even 
more innovative new products and reduce the profits of their predecessors. Consequently, 
proponents of this dynamic theory of competition do not postulate perfect but imperfect competition 
as a prerequisite for economic progress. 
The theory of imperfect competition further developed into the concept of workable competition. In the 
beginning, workable competition was seen as a second-best approach, looking for a situation as 
close to perfect competition as possible. However, later on the concept of workable competition 
became a viable concept to increase and optimize not only allocative efficiency but also technical 
efficiency, dynamic efficiency, consumer sovereignty and economic liberty.7 Workable competition 
considers elements of monopoly necessary for economic progress. Perfect competition and economic 
progress exclude one another. However, the concept fails to define exactly how perfect or rather how 
imperfect a market should be in order to reach these targets.  
The so-called Austrian school, criticizing especially the neoclassical economic theory, developed the 
most radical approach towards competition. According to the Austrian school, states of equilibrium do 
not tell us anything about competition as a dynamic process, because in equilibrium enterprises do 
not have any incentives to compete against other market actors by optimizing price and quality of 
their products. Proponents of the Austrian school define competition as a process of searching and 
discovering (von Hayek 1976). Thus, competition is open with regard to its results. Competition even 
is valued in itself as a vehicle of economic liberty. Individual liberty is considered essential for 
inventions, innovations and imitation. If liberty is constricted, the process of trial and error on the way 
                                                        
6 We do not include a formal mathematical definition of this so-called Pareto- or allocative efficiency. An optimal state 
according to this definition is reached if nobody can be better off without somebody else being worse off.  
7 Technical efficiency is defined by producing an optimal amount of goods for a fixed amount of money or a fixed 
amount of good for an optimal amount of money, quality is to remain constant. 7 
to most efficient solutions is also constricted. Distributive measures by the state are believed to be a 
constraint to individual liberty and economic progress. 
The short tour of economic theory with regard to the meaning of competition reveals that there are 
several functions competition is supposed to fulfill. First, there is static efficiency. Static efficiency is 
further divided into optimal factor allocation or allocative efficiency, and optimal value for money or 
technical efficiency. Secondly, there is dynamic efficiency, which stands for a high rate of technical 
innovation and the elimination of non-efficient enterprises. Finally, consumer sovereignty and 
economic liberty are functions of competition. With regard to these functions there are two important 
aspects to note. One is the fact that in most theories only some of the functions are included in the 
ideal outcome or target system. The other is that those theories do not mention distributive functions 
such as fair income distribution or equal access to certain goods and services. Some theories are 
even consider them as inimical for reaching the other functions.  
2.2 Managed Competition Model 
The market for health services is different from other markets for products and services (Arrow 1963). 
There are several market imperfections such as moral hazard, supplier-induced demand and X-
inefficiencies  (Bartelsmann/ten Cate 1997).  Moral hazard exists when the existence of insurance 
increases the possibility of incurring a covered loss and/or the size of the covered loss. The existence 
of moral hazard implies that insured people use more health services than people with no or limited 
insurance (Rice 1998). This is not a result of “moral perfidy” but of rational economic behavior (Pauly 
1968). Health economists conclude that this rational behavior leads to welfare losses, since people 
demand services although the individual utility derived from these services is much lower than the 
social cost. Supplier-induced demand on the other hand points to inefficiency produced not on the 
demand side but on the supply side. It is assumed that especially providers of highly specialized 
services do not act as perfect agents for their patients, but induce demand among patients for their 
services which have to paid by the third-party insurer. X-inefficiencies occur due to imperfect 
information individual patients have about individual providers. Consequently, inefficient providers are 
not forced out of the market (Bartelsmann/ten Cate 1997). 
At least in theory, the managed competition model as framed by Alan Enthoven provides a way out of 
these constraints to static and dynamic efficiency in health care markets. With the managed 
competition model in place, Enthoven argues, market actors have incentives to behave as if they 
were in a perfectly competitive environment (Enthoven 1978; 1988; 1993). Price signals and 
competitive pressures are designed to let cost-conscious consumers and profit-seeking providers as 
well as insurers interact. Moral hazard, supplier-induced demand and X-inefficiencies are avoided by 
creating specific incentives and instruments as well as particular institutions (Bartelsmann/ten Cate 
1997). 8 
In this concept new market actors, so-called sponsors, act as a purchasing agents for a pool of 
consumers and define the basic rules for competition among insurers and providers, supply 
consumers with information and monitors the behavior of insurers in order to prevent risk selection. 
Insurers offer potential consumers contracts at or above a standardized range of health services at a 
community-rated premium. Consumers are free to switch between plans periodically. Ideally, the 
sponsor collects premiums and distributes these premiums on a risk-adjusted basis to the individual 
insurers. Additionally, the sponsor provides consumers with information on price, quality, level of 
coverage and co-insurance schemes of the insurers. Insurers are free to contract selectively with 
providers or even integrate with them. Additionally, they have to bear the financial risk of acting on the 
market. Thus, insurers are induced to monitor health care delivery as they compete for insured, and 
providers are forced to increase technical efficiency as they compete for contracts with insurance 
agencies. Insurers compete for consumers with the level of their premium, the range of the services 
covered and the quality of the services which they have contracted. Effective competition policy 
makes sure that there is high degree of competition on both the insurer and the provider market. 
Competition is enhanced by free market access for providers and insurers.  
In this model the three pitfalls on health care markets are avoided. Moral hazard is reduced by the 
introduction of deductibles or co-insurance. X-inefficiency is reduced, because providers will lose 
market shares if their unit costs are too high. Over-consumption due to supplier-induced demand is 
unlikely, since insurers closely monitor the delivery of services. Table 1 summarizes incentives and 
instruments of the managed competition model.8 
Table 1: Market Actors, Incentives and Instruments of the Managed Competition Model 
Market Actors  Incentives  Instruments 
Competing insurers  Financial risk; risk-adjusted 
capitation; free market access for 
new entrants 
Selective contracting of providers; 
setting premiums, coinsurance and 
deductibles; vertical integration of 
insurers and providers  
Competing providers  Financial risk (loss of contracts, loss 
of patients); free market access for 
new entrants 
Price competition; quality of services; 
horizontal and vertical integration 
Well-informed consumers  Standardized benefits package for 
consumers 
Free choice (and exit) of insurance 
agency; choice of provider; direct 
access to consumer information  
Sponsor   Political incentives  Effective competition policy; 
encouraging selective contracting; 
providing consumer information on 
health insurance and provision; 
issuing rules of access and 
acceptance to (social) insurance 
Source: based on Enthoven/Kronick 1989; Enthoven 1993; Schut/van Doorslaer 1999 
                                                        
8 Market actors cannot influence incentives while they are free to use any one or all of the instruments. 9 
Implicitly, the managed competition model relies on three central assumptions with regard to the 
behavior of market actors. All of these assumptions are interlinked, each one is necessary but not 
sufficient: 
1.  Insurers compete with each other via price, quality and range of services without having 
permanent monopoly power. 
2.  Consumers have free choice between insurers and exercise their right to choose. 
3.  Non-effective and/or non-efficient providers are induced by insurers to work more effectively 
and efficiently and provide good quality. Otherwise, they are not contracted. 
If and only if the postulated behavior of market actors is realized, the aims of the managed 
competition model can be realized. Expected outcomes do not only include an increase of static 
efficiency but also an increase of dynamic efficiency, since it is assumed that insurers and providers 
increasingly consider the cost-effectiveness of new technologies.  
Theoretically, the managed competition model is extremely attractive to systems with social health 
insurance like Germany and the Netherlands for two reasons. First, it promises not only to increase 
efficiency, but also to maintain a high standard of equity by implementing regulation in order to avoid 
risk selection by the insurers and by safeguarding reasonably equal access to health insurance and 
health care services. Second, the model shifts the responsibility for cost control to a large degree 
from government to market actors: 
„ … The competitive market would generate cost controls, but they would be private market controls 
based on individual and group judgements about cost versus value and not public controls based on 
arbitrary numerical standards, insensitive to the quality or the value of the services (Enthoven 1978: 715).” 
Thus, the ideal outcome of the managed competition model is quite far reaching and can be 
summarized as follows:9 
•  Increase of allocative efficiency by considering consumer preferences; 
•  Increase of technical efficiency by increase of competitive pressure on insurers and 
providers; 
•  Increase of dynamic efficiency by taking into account costs when deciding about 
investments; 
•  Maintenance of broad access to health care and avoidance of risk selection by implementing 
regulation; 
•  Shift of responsibility for cost control from government to market actors. 
                                                        
9 Due to this ambitious target system the model has been described as the ‘sheep with five legs’ (Schut 1995a). 10 
 
2.3 Theoretical deficiencies and institutional eclecticism of the MC Model 
Even without putting the managed competition model into practice it is to be criticized on several 
levels. We focus on theoretical deficiencies and what may be called institutional eclecticism. The 
managed competition model explicitly and implicitly refers to neoclassical economic theory. Explicitly, 
Enthoven defines the managed competition model as an “integrated framework that combines 
rational principles of microeconomics with careful observation what works (Enthoven 1993: 45).” 
Implicitly, the concept is a bit more ambiguous. On the one hand, it refers to neoclassical functions of 
competition such as increasing the allocative and technical efficiency; it seeks to create a second best 
solution by simulating a perfectly competitive market. On the other hand, the neoclassical framework 
does not explain dynamic efficiency, the maintenance of equity and especially cost control by market 
actors. The ambitious ideal outcome seems to refer to the concept of workable competition, but even 
within this framework equity and cost control cannot be explained. Equity defined as equal access to 
health insurance and to health services is nowhere to be found in competition theory. Enthoven 
himself concedes that the managed competition model probably cannot guarantee equal access, but 
still finds a way out by defending a multi-tier system of health services: 
„In the long run, a multi-tier system is probably better for the poor than a rigid single-tier system. The 
more expensive tier may generate innovations in quality and service that are eventually adopted by 
lower-tier plans. Imagine the quality of cars we would have if everybody had to drive the same 
government-manufactured car (Enthoven 1994: 1420)!”10 
Furthermore, it is an illusion to expect managed competition to reduce total health care costs:  
“It should be realized that market-oriented reforms are primarily targeted at reducing unit costs, not at 
reducing total health care costs. Thus, if more units, or units of higher quality will be traded in health care 
markets, total health care expenditure may still go up. Nevertheless, a successful implementation of 
some form of regulated or managed competition may result in slowing down the growth of health care 
expenditure because it can reduce the amount of inappropriate care, encourage productivity 
improvement and stimulate the development of cost-reducing technologies (Schut 1995a: 38).” 
As to the matter of institutional eclecticism, it is important to note that Enthoven’s managed 
competition model since its first introduction went through some significant changes. In the beginning 
he used the term regulated competition, although the extent of regulation in the early version 
(Enthoven 1978) was much smaller than the later ones (Enthoven/Kronick 1989). The author changed 
the name of the model to managed competition in order to refer to a more dynamic expression 
instead of to the dusty concept of regulation, although ironically new institutions with regulative tasks 
were introduced in the age of management and not in the age of regulation. Kuttner aptly criticizes 
the extent of regulation: 
                                                        
10 This point sounds similar to the so-called trickle-down effect which was a central argument to defend supply-
oriented Reaganomics. 11 
„At the core of pro-market reform is one more unreal premise – and a highly ironic one. The whole 
scheme depends on a heroic degree of regulation, to prevent an opportunistic race to the bottom. One 
could fill an entire chapter discussing the kind and extent of regulations necessary to make such a 
system work. Enthoven himself, in the course of proposing a plan contrasting virtuous market incentives 
with dubious government regulation, calls for literally dozens of regulations… Clearly, pro-market reforms 
turn out to require massive government regulation. And … it further presumes regulators with the 
wisdom, public-mindedness, and incorruptibility of philosopher-kings (Kuttner 1997: 138-139).”  
Another consequence of this step-by-step process of adjusting institutional arrangements is an 
implicit shift from a private-market model towards a social-insurance model.11 Looking at the 
aggregate of the behavioral assumptions and the degree of regulation necessary for the managed 
competition model to work, it appears that Enthoven has left the private-market model and shifted to 
the social-insurance model developed by European countries in the 19th and 20th century.  
Social health insurance implies that government determines the entitlements and mandates 
participation for all or a part of the population. Moreover, it requires substantial regulation for access 
rules and cross-subsidization between population sub-groups in order to safeguard universal access 
to health care. In those systems, governments play the role of ´sponsors´ on behalf of the common 
good. Based on their legislative power, they set the rules of social insurance and of competition; they 
mandate insurance for certain population groups, and impose payment schemes with cross-subsidies 
between high income and low income groups in order to protect incomes and ensure fair sharing of 
the financial burden. The private market cannot fulfill those regulatory and redistributive functions.  
Once such rules are in place, it does not matter very much whether a system like that is called public 
or private (Okma 2000). 
However, we do not argue that the model of managed competition does not provide an interesting 
approach to the problem of increasing effectiveness and efficiency of publicly funded goods and 
services. Most if not all OECD countries face the problem of reconciling the social goals of universal 
access and fair distributions of the financial burden with the need to improve the efficiency and rein in 
the growth of public spending.  
3  Managed Competition in the Netherlands 
Although the is no clear direct link between Enthoven’s proposals and the reforms of the Dutch health 
care system since 1989, there are several elements suggesting at least a strong similarity of the 
target system as well as of incentives and instruments of the reform. The Dutch reform efforts have 
been extensively discussed (van de Ven 1993; Schut 1995b; Okma 1997; Robinson 1998). We compare 
the elements of the reforms with the managed competition model as outlined above, especially with 
regard to the differences between the original model and the adjusted model in the Netherlands. After 
                                                        
11 Enthoven framed his Consumer Choice Health Plan in an ideological climate of anti-governmentalism in the USA 
of the late 1970s (Okma 2000). 12 
that, we evaluate the effects of the adjusted model of managed competition in the Netherlands, 
focusing on effects on markets of health insurance and provision of care as well as on distributive 
effects.12 Finally, we discuss the reasons for non-intended, and sometimes undesired effects. 
3.1 Dutch health care reforms: Model of Managed Competition Put into Practice? 
Comparing the expected outcome of the managed competition model to the aims of the health care 
reforms proposed by the so-called Dekker-commission of 1987, there are significant similarities. The 
reforms sought to increase the efficiency of the system while maintaining a high standard of equity 
and universal access (Ministry of Welfare Health and Cultural Affairs 1988). Costs were to be controlled 
partly by market forces and partly through market regulation. Although the reform process proved to 
be more difficult than expected, a fair amount of the original proposals were actually implemented 
(Okma 1997). The instruments and incentives reveal important similarities to Enthoven’s managed 
competition model. This is true although neither the authors of the Dekker-report nor the Dutch 
government labeled their reform plans managed competition. This label was added in a later stage by 
Dutch health economists who discovered the surprising similarities to the managed competition 
model (van de Ven 1990; Schut 1992; Schut/Hermanns 1997).13 At second thought, however, such 
similarity is less surprising. There are, after all, only that many models for funding and organizing 
health care. Any given health care system may be described in terms of its particular mix of funding 
(out of general taxation, social and private health insurance and out of pocket payment), and 
contracting arrangements (integrated systems; public and private contracting, and reimbursement) 
(OECD 1992; OECD 1994). Most OECD countries have public funding as its main source. In many 
cases, there is a shift towards a public or private contracting system. Within the boundaries of such 
parameters, there are few options for improving efficiency while safeguarding universal access, 
ranging from strict centralized government control to the introduction of competitive elements in the 
system.  
Table 2: Actors, Incentives and Instruments in the adjusted Model of Managed Competition in 
the Netherlands 
                                                        
12 In order to set apart the original managed competition model from the content of the Dutch health care reforms we 
refer to the latter with the term adjusted model of managed competition.  
13 Similar to Enthoven himself the reforms first were labeled Regulated Competition, later on Workable Competition 
and finally managed competition.  13 
Actors Incentives  Instruments 
Insurers 
 
Financial risks caused by 
prospective budgets; need to gain 
strategic market positions; need to 
set nominal premiums 
Risk selection; improving 
administrative efficiency; selective 
contracting self-employed health 
professionals and institutions; own 
and manage health facilities; 
negotiating prices, tariffs and volume 





Selective contracting of insurers, 
free choice of patients 
Create market power, regional 
monopolies; attract media attention; 
negotiate contracts with insurers on 
prices, volume, and organization of 
services; improve quality 
Consumers  Differences in flat rate premiums, 
quality of services, supplemental 
insurance, collective contracts  
Consumer information, direct internet 
access; attract media attention; exit: 
change provider and insurer (or 
threaten to change) 




  Competition law; basic rules of social 
insurance (coverage, cross-subsidy 
schemes, eligibility and access rules) 
Analyzing the incentives of the current health care system, the financial risk for sickness funds in the 
Netherlands still is quite low. It gradually increased form 3 percent in 1993 to 35 percent in 1999 (but 
is expected to further increase in the near future). The sickness funds receive a budget according to a 
prospective risk-adjustment formula including age, sex, region, disability and employment status. 
There is a standardized benefits package for consumers. The high level of entitlements has been 
reduced by de-listing dental services for adults, homeopathic drugs and a few other services. Patients 
pay such excluded services out of their own pocket, or may seek coverage by voluntary 
supplementary insurance. Insurers have free market access. This is true not only for new market 
actors, but also for traditional sickness funds who used to be restricted to one region. Market access 
for providers is more restricted. There still are supply controls by government, and providers have 
only limited power over the capacity of professional education. The national  competition authority 
(Nederlandse Mededingingsauthoriteit, NMa) established in 1998 is also responsible for the health 
care sector14. Consumers are free to change sickness fund once per year, but they have little 
incentive to do so as the level of nominal premiums they pay directly to their funds still is very modest. 
In general, cost sharing is still very limited. A more extensive cost-sharing scheme was abolished 
after two years, because of its high administrative costs. There is no sponsor in the Netherlands, but 
government fulfills the main sponsor functions on behalf of the insured (framing competition law; 
providing consumer information; determining the eligibility criteria and coverage of social insurance).  
                                                        
14 In April 2001, the NMa announced steps to prohibit the general tariff agreements betwen health insurers and 
general practitioners.  14 
Another important difference with the managed competition model lies in the extent of competition. 
Only a part of the Dutch health care system is subject to this kind of regulation. A large segment of 
the population, about 40%, carries private health insurance, and the supplementary insurance covers 
less than 5% of all health expenditure. The 1994 coalition government abolished the plan of its 
predecessors to integrate social and private health insurance. The funding system continues to have 
a fragmented character, since catastrophic risks are covered by a separate long term care insurance 
for the entire population. For this care, providers have largely grouped into regional monopolies. 
Altogether, it can be argued that only around 40 percent of all health care spending is subject to 
managed competition. 
The competition instruments and incentives are only partially developed. Health insurers only face 
very limited price competition (Schut/Hassink 1999). Around 90 percent of health insurance 
contributions is income-related. This premium is regulated by the health authorities. It is the same for 
all insurers and is distributed according to the risk-adjustment formula mentioned above. The revenue 
generated from risk-adjusted budgets does not cover all expenses of the sickness funds. The funds 
have to finance around ten percent of their budget by nominal premiums the funds set themselves.  
Those nominal premiums may differ between sickness funds. Theoretically, this nominal premium is 
supposed to signal relative efficiency of the sickness funds to the consumers, but in practice this price 
signal is weak because the amounts are modest. Price competition between providers is even more 
limited. The (maximum) tariffs for ambulatory care services are fixed by the Central Tariff Authority 
(College Tarieven Gezondheidszorg, CTG) within the boundaries of global budgets determined by the 
Health Ministry. Insurers and providers may contract at prices below those maximum tariffs, but not 
above them. Also, hospital budgets are fixed by the Tariff Authority. Insurers are able to contract 
selectively with providers of ambulatory care, e.g. general physicians, specialists and 
physiotherapists. They still are obliged to offer contracts to all hospitals and other health care 
facilities. Vertical integration of insurers and providers is very limited. Since 1998, insurers are 
allowed to manage and own pharmacies but only a few have actually done so. Health insurers are 
only free to compete with each other about the range of additional services not included in the basic 
coverage set by law.  
3.2 Effects on the Insurer Market 
After the introduction of competition between sickness funds in 1990, the health insurance landscape 
changed significantly. A process of formal mergers between sickness funds and informal cooperation 
between sickness funds and private insurers sharply reduced the number of insurers (de Roo 1995; 
Schut 1996). Especially sickness funds were very intent on defending their regional market shares by 
merging with their competitors.15 Furthermore, cooperation with private insurers was necessary, 
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because sickness funds are not allowed to offer supplementary insurance. At the same time they are 
legally prohibited to merge with private insurers.16 The number of both sickness funds and private 
insurers dropped by more than a third, even including new market entrants (Schut/Hassink 1999). This 
first wave of concentration led to large market shares for the biggest funds. The seven biggest 
conglomerates of sickness funds and their private partners control around 80 percent of social health 
insurance and around 70 percent of private health insurance (van den Hauten 1999). This 
development is even more significant on the regional level. According to a spokesperson of the 
National Competition Authority the regional market share of the respective market leader ranges at 
70 percent and above. Thus, formally regional monopolies are abolished but in fact they are still in 
place. Individuals can choose, but the impact is quite low (Greß 2000; Groenewegen/Greß 2000). 
The 1990s not only witnessed a major restructuring of the market, but also a significant increase of 
competition on the market for collective contracts. After the privatization of social insurance schemes 
for sickness pay and disability insurance private insurance companies offer a whole range of new 
products. Consequently, this increased the cooperation of public and private insurers and even with 
financial conglomerates. These conglomerates are able to offer employers and their employees 
integrated insurance including social and private health insurance and labor management services. 
Although at least competition for collective contracts has increased, price competition between 
sickness funds at the moment does not provide an sufficient incentive for consumers to switch health 
insurers. The income-related contribution are fixed nationally, while nominal premiums differ only 
around 100 NLG per year per insured.17. Furthermore, sickness funds did not convince consumers 
that they invested in the quality of health services and administrative efficiency. However, 
administrative services such as opening hours, accessibility and waiting list management did  improve 
significantly since the introduction of managed competition. Several studies conclude that only one 
about one percent of all insured did indeed switch from one sickness fund to another annually 
(Hoykaas/Klaasen 1997; Kalshoven 1999; Schut/Hassink 1999). Sickness funds do not suffer from the 
lack of competition for consumers. They are still able to build up their financial reserves. Especially 
supplementary insurance proved to be quite profitable. 
The Dutch health insurance market underwent significant change since the first steps of 
implementation of the adjusted model of managed competition. However, the model assumes 
insurers to compete with each other via price, quality and range of services without having permanent 
monopoly power. At the moment, we have to conclude that insurers do not follow this behavioral 
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responsible for the management of the sickness fund and the private insurer. However, legally the companies have 
to remain separate. 
17 With regard to the importance of price for the choice of consumers, Germany differs quite significantly form the 
Netherlands (see 4.2) 16 
assumption of the model. The same is true for the assumption that consumers exercise their right to 
choose between insurers.18 
3.3 Effects on the Provider Market 
Following the analysis of the changes in the insurer market, we now turn to the behavior of providers 
of health care. Like other countries of Western Europe, Dutch health care has a large number of self-
employed professionals, hospitals and other health facilities offering a wide range of medical care and 
related services to the population. Most facilities are independent, not-for-profit organizations, usually 
owned and managed by religious or groups or charitable foundations. Those ideological roots have 
become less visible today but the nonprofit, independent legal status remains dominant model. There 
are few state institutions. Private clinics are allowed on condition they closely collaborate with existing 
hospitals. In the last decade, this organization and management underwent major change. Almost all 
sectors of health care saw rapid processes of vertical and horizontal integration by formal mergers or 
the development of informal networks between professionals and institutions. Hospitals and mental 
care institutions increased the scale of their operations; retirement homes, nursing homes and home 
care organizations integrated their organizations to improve the coordination of their services. There 
is little evidence that  those changes have increased (or decreased) the quality or efficiency of 
services. Some studies suggest that strategic considerations and the desire to become a dominant 
actor in the regional market were more important motivations that concerns about the patients.  
Moreover, there has been little change in the contractual relations with the health insurers. Although 
empirical data on this subject is quite limited, it seems to be obvious that sickness funds have hardly 
used their power to contract selectively with providers. Insurers and providers are still negotiate 
collectively on a national and regional level. There is some exclusion of providers with severe quality 
problems although this is not a new development since the introduction of managed competition. 
Several interview partners from sickness funds, provider organizations and independent experts 
confirm this analysis. Furthermore, several studies conclude that there is almost no culture of 
bargaining on the micro-level (Ziekenfondsraad 1999). The expected increase in competition is simply 
not there (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg 1998). Furthermore, the same is true for the degree 
of price competition between providers. The chairman of the Health Tariffs Authority COTG concludes 
that there are no contracts with prices below maximum tariffs (Scheerder 1999). 
In order to broaden the empirical basis about the perception of competition by one group of key 
market actors, the Center for Social Policy Research at the University of Bremen conducted a study 
with Dutch general physicians (GPs). In Dutch health care, GPs act as gatekeepers for patients. They 
                                                        
18 Theoretically, even the „shadow of exit“ may be sufficient as incentive for sickness funds to act in the intended 
way. We assume that the threat has to be support by a considerable degree of actual exits of at least two to five 
percent of the insured. 17 
have strong and long lasting ties with their patients as well as with their colleagues. They were asked 
how strong they consider the influence of competition on their own area of work and on other areas of 
Dutch health care. Table 3 3 shows that around 95 percent of all respondents consider the influence 
of competition on both areas as weak or not perceptible. 
Table 3: Perception of competitive pressures by Dutch general practitioners  
How strong do you consider the influence 
of competition… 
Very Strong  Strong   Weak  Not 
Perceptible 
…on your own area of work?  0,4  2,6  51,3  25,2 
…on the Dutch health care system  -  5,1  82,7  12,2 
Source: Lukas-Nülle 2000. N=497 
The effects or more precisely the non-effects on the provider market confirm the assumption that the 
third behavioral assumption of the managed competition model so far has not been acted upon by 
market actors. There has been hardly any selective contracting with health providers. That means 
they had little or no incentives to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of their services. 
3.4 Effects on Equity 
One of the most appealing features of the managed competition model for social health insurance is 
that it is supposed to avoid non-desired effects on equity. We evaluate this assumption by analyzing 
the effects of cost sharing and the exclusion of services from social insurance. Furthermore, we ask 
whether the sickness funds did engage in risk selection rather than improving the quality of health 
services. Finally, we assess the overall impact of incentives and instruments of managed competition 
on income distribution. 
Cost-sharing is supposed to increase cost-consciousness of consumers and decrease 
overconsumption. The Dutch government introduced a cost-sharing scheme in 1997. It included a co-
payment of 20 percent of all costs for medical services except visits to the GP. For hospital services 
there was a small nominal payment. However, the annual amount of co-payment was limited to 200 
NLG, in for some groups of insured even to 100 NLG. At the same time the nominal premium that all 
insured pay directly to their sickness fund was reduced by 110 NLG for all insured. According to a 
government statement the target of this co-payment scheme was twofold. In addition to he reduction 
of moral hazard, the consumers were supposed to carry a larger share of health care expenses 
(Delnoij, Groenwegen et al. 2000). Only two years after its implementation, the scheme was abolished, 
because of its high administrative costs. In 1997, the scheme incurred a loss of more than 300 million 18 
NLG.19 Except for one pharmaceuticals, there were no significant effects on the utilization of services 
by consumers. Consumption by lower income groups dropped much more than that of higher income 
groups. This confirms international research suggesting that modest cost-sharing schemes do not 
work while schemes that are more extensive almost certainly affect lower income groups much 
stronger than higher income groups (Newhouse/Insurance Experiment Group 1993). 
Exclusion of services from the basic benefits package increased options for insurers to compete via 
supplementary insurance. In 1991 the Dutch government asked the so-called Dunning-Commission 
to recommend a procedure to define what services should be excluded from the basic health 
insurance coverage. The commission suggested a system of sieves to determine which services 
were to be excluded from the sickness fund scheme. The Dutch government never really used this 
procedure (van der Grinten/Kasdorp 1999). However, some services were excluded, most importantly 
dental services for adults in 1995. One study analyzed the use of dental services after the exclusion. 
Respondents were grouped according to insurance status (public or private) and according to the 
existence of supplementary insurance (yes or no). While there were only minor changes in other 
groups, the use of dental services of people with public insurance and without private supplementary 
insurance for dental services dropped dramatically (Friele, Bakker et al. 1996). Since some 95 percent 
of sickness fund insured have opted for supplementary insurance, effects probably are limited. 
Unfortunately, there is no information on the coverage for dental services only, so that it is difficult to 
assess the overall effect of the exclusion of dental services from the basic package. However, it 
should be obvious that a more extensive exclusion of services would lead to a much more disparate 
utilization pattern. 
One of the most important assumptions for the functioning for the managed competition model 
(adjusted or not) is that sickness funds do not focus their attention on preferred risk selection rather 
than on improving health services for their insured. Risk selection is defined by trying to attract good 
risks and by trying to deter bad risks.20 Theoretically, insurers are able to identify subgroups of 
insured within the risk groups the risk-adjustment formula defines. Dutch sickness funds have tried to 
improve their risk structure by selective marketing in certain regions and by collective contracts with 
employers. Following that development the Dutch health ministry has improved the adjustment 
formula by including urbanization and employment status. There is a lot of research to improve the 
formula by integrating diagnostic information in order to close the gap between the knowledge the 
sickness funds have about their insured and the information included in the formula (Lamers 1998; 
van Barneveld, Lamers et al. 1999). Although theoretically risk selection may be profitable for sickness 
funds in the short run, in the long run costs due to negative publicity in the media have to be 
                                                        
19 There were revenue losses due lower premiums of 871 mill. NLG and administrative costs of 50 mill. NLG on the 
one side and revenue through co-payments of 600 mill. NLG on the other side.  
20 Good risks are insured with health care expenses under the risk-adjusted payment the insurers receive for them. 
Bad risks are insured with expenses over the risk-adjusted payment. 19 
considered. Consequently, at the moment there is no evidence of systematic risk selection of Dutch 
sickness funds. 
There has been extensive research about the influence of reform elements on income distribution. 
Researchers concluded that several reform elements such as nominal premiums, cost sharing and 
supplementary insurance have a regressive effect.21 However, other reform elements counteract this 
regressive effect. For example, the integration of social and private health insurance would extend the 
income-related payments over the entire population. And, while implementing cost sharing the 
government also lowered nominal premiums. Furthermore, the extent of supplementary insurance 
and of nominal premiums is quite low. In balance, the effects of managed competition on income 
distribution are only slightly regressive.  
3.5 Reasons for Non-Intended Effects 
It is clear that there is a large gap between the expected results of managed competition in the 
Netherlands and the changes that really took place. Actors did not behave according to the three 
behavioral assumptions of the managed competition model. It seems that the expectations of the 
outcome of the adjusted model were not very realistic. As Evans has argued for many years, 
aggregate health expenditures are, by definition, equal to aggregate incomes of health professionals 
and others (Evans 1997). There is no reason to assume that health professionals or others are willing 
to contribute to cost savings by giving up income voluntarily. And since there is ample room for 
supply-induced demand, price controls or spending limits of some sort usually result in increased 
volume or shifts in expenditure elsewhere particularly in markets where the affected parties control a 
scarce resource, e.g. the number of physicians or very specialized technology. Understanding such 
reactions helps to understand the non-intended effects of the adjusted MC model in Dutch health 
care much better. 
Within the Dutch institutional and cultural context, we identify four central conflicts or trade-offs as 
reasons for this development. First, there is a conflict between cost control and competition. Second, 
there is a conflict between competition and cooperation in the health field. Third, there are conflicts 
between distributive targets and competition and fourth between political rationality and competition. 
Taken together, these conflicts render managed competition in the Netherlands, at least for the 
moment, to be a theoretical model rather than a viable concept. 
A conflict between cost control and competition ensues from government policy which is rather 
ambiguous. Certainly, the government postulates competition and increased responsibility of actors 
such as insurers, providers and consumers. However, much policy is actually focused on cost control 
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means that the burden for lower income groups is lower than for higher income groups. If the burden for all income 
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and regulation of supply rather than a shift of responsibilities from government to other market 
parties. This also means that as of 2001, market actors have few incentives and instruments to act 
according to the behavioral assumptions of the MC model. Insurers still face limited financial risk, they 
are not allowed to contract selectively with hospitals. Furthermore, insurers are able to compete about 
the nominal premium only and the share of supplementary insurance is quite low.  More importantly, 
capacities of some categories of providers are quite tight. According to interviews with sickness funds 
managers they are quite happy to be able to contract with almost any GP, because supply is 
extremely short. Only at the end of 2000, the Health Ministry announced it would expand the capacity 
of medical schools. 
The second conflict is caused by a contradiction between the cultural and institutional context of 
primary care in the Netherlands and competition. Traditionally, ties between patients and GPs are 
much stronger than ties between insurers and insured. Consumers rather change their insurer than 
their physician. Accordingly, insurers are afraid of losing their insured if they stop contracting certain 
GPs. Since high market shares are one of the most important strategic targets of all sickness funds 
they try to avoid the loss of insured. Next to the close relationship between GPs and their patients 
there is strong local and regional cooperation between GPs, encouraged by the Ministry of Health. 
Local groups of physicians organize night and emergency services, regional groups meet to discuss 
prescription patterns as well as quality assurance issues. For sickness funds, these local groups of 
GPs are the smallest unit to contract with. Existing groups of GPs may be unwilling to welcome 
newcomers in their area, and sickness funds are hesitant to contract individual physicians who may 
not have access to shared arrangement for night calls.  
The conflict between distributive targets and competition so far has been well balanced in the 
Netherlands. Although cost-sharing and exclusion of services from the basic benefits package are an 
integral part of the managed competition model, they have not been widely used. Reasons range 
from negative income effects of cost-sharing to the impossibility to define a consensual procedure for 
the exclusion of health services. Furthermore, Dutch governments have been keen to avoid preferred 
risk selection by sickness funds. The introduction of the prospective budgets for the sickness funds 
based on a risk-adjustment mechanism is based on a step-by–step implementation, with careful 
adjustments to prevent risk selection by the funds. Almost all measures affecting incomes negatively 
provoked strong public reactions and forced governments to take compensatory measures or to 
exempt certain population groups. They realize the trade-off between the consistent application of  
the Managed Competition model and the need to limit distributional effects. Substantial cost-sharing 
schemes or de-listing of services may compromise access to health care services, especially for 
lower income groups. This has become clear not only from international research but even from 
experiences in the Netherlands. Additionally, higher levels of cost-sharing and supplementary 
insurance as well as a higher share of nominal premiums result in a more regressive income 
distribution. Dutch policy makers have shown themselves aware of such trade-offs. 21 
Finally, there is a conflict between political rationality and competition. For different reasons, including 
technical complexities of designing the prospective budget model for sickness funds, the reform was 
implemented step by step. At the beginning of this implementation process there seemed to be strong 
political support by political parties and interest groups. But the gradual implementation also left a lot 
of room for anticipatory behavior of market actors (Commissie Willems 1993). Over time, political 
consensus about the reforms weakened considerably (Okma 1997). Facing mounting opposition, 
government slowed down the implementation process and abolished several key elements of the 
reform. This compromised the consistency of the adjusted MC model. The tensions described above 
illustrate the importance of cultural and contextual factors in the shaping and outcome of social 
policies. 
4  Managed Competition – Policy Conclusions for Germany and The 
Netherlands 
In this section we compare the institutional framework of Germany and the Netherlands, and analyse 
how the differences in this institutional setting may affect the adjustment of the managed competition 
model in both countries. Further, we address possible policy options as a consequence of institutional 
deficiencies.  However, since we are aware of the pitfalls of comparing different international health 
care systems, we start this section with a short discussion of these pitfalls. 
4.1 Pitfalls of Comparing Health Care Reforms 
„… Learning about other countries is rather like breathing: only the brain dead are likely to avoid the 
experience (Klein 1995: 96).” 
When comparing health care systems and especially health care reforms, there are at least four 
pitfalls which should be avoided. First, it should be differentiated between learning about other 
countries from learning from their experience (Marmor 1995) Learning about a country is about 
collecting information, learning from a country is about reflecting on that information. Rather like 
health care itself, supply of information seems to create its own demand. Obviously policy makers are 
attracted to other countries as much as scientists to laboratories. New policy theories or techniques 
can be tested. Unfortunately, no two countries are so much alike as laboratories in scientific 
experiments. Therefore, we have to include the institutional and even cultural context of these 
countries into our analysis (Klein 1995). 
Secondly, it is easy to assume that similar terms have the same meaning in different countries when 
they are used frequently in all of them. However, in practice their use reflects different meanings of 
which the foreign observer may be unaware (Ranade 1998). The term managed competition is a good 
example for this pitfall. Consequently, we try to differentiate between the theoretical model of 22 
managed competition as originally developed in the context of private health insurance markets by 
Enthoven and the implementation of managed competition in the social insurance environment of 
Germany and the Netherlands. These three forms of managed competition are quite different with 
regard to content and institutional framework. 
The third pitfall can be characterized as follows: 
„…Most policy debates in most countries are parochial affairs. They address national developments in a 
particular domain … and embody conflicting visions of what policies the particular country should adopt 
… when cross-national examples are employed in such parochial styles, their use is typically part of 
policy warfare more than a policy understanding (Marmor 1986: 617).” 
In order to avoid becoming part of policy warfare instead of policy understanding, in this article we try 
to follow a difficult path. This path meanders somewhere between economic and political analysis, 
individual curiosity, impartial academic analysis and the necessity for practical policy consequences. 
Last but not least, the fourth pitfall is relevant especially for the analysis of health care reforms and 
refers to the “fuzziness” of reforms. The causes of this fuzziness lie not only in ordinary mistakes and 
in misunderstandings, but also in the vagueness of the definition of national policies.22 In order to 
minimize the danger of ordinary mistakes and the vagueness of policy measures it is important no to 
rely solely on secondary sources. If possible, the use of primary sources and the consultation of 
experts should be added (Kroneman/van der Zee 1997).23 
4.2 Actors, Incentives and Instruments in Germany and in the Netherlands 
Table 4 presents an overview of some of the main institutional characteristics of the German and 
Dutch health care systems. Both systems show strong similarities, especially with regard to 
underlying values (Kirkman-Liff 1991). 
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in other words: „governing by magic and managing by speech (Kroneman/van der Zee 1997).“ 
23 An obvious sign for the awareness of this pitfall is the fact that this article is written by Dutch  and German co-
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Table 4: Underlying values and institutional characteristics of the German and the Dutch 
health care system 
  Germany Netherlands 
Underlying Values  Solidarity (Mechanism to provide cohesiveness) 
Mutual obligations (Responsibility of individuals) 
Share responsibility for shaping and outcome of social policies  
Self-Regulation  
Health care as one of the corner stones of social protection 
Funding of Health Care  Social Health Insurance (90%) via 
income-dependent contributions 
Private Health Insurance (10%) via 
risk-dependent premiums 
Separate peak organizations 
Social Health Insurance (65%) via 
income-dependent contributions and 
nominal premiums 
Private Health Insurance (35%) via 
risk-dependent premiums 
United peak organization 
Delivery of Health Care  Public, semi-public and private 
providers 
Strong peak organizations of 
providers act formally as contracting 
partners (national and regional level) 
Public, semi-public and private 
providers 
Strong peak organizations of 
providers act informally as 
contracting partners  
Regulation of Health Insurance  Federal government, regional 
governments, several quasi-public 
agencies, extensive involvement and 
consultation of employers and 
employees (peak organizations) 
Central government, competition 
authority, tariffs authority, other 
quasi-public agencies 
Regulation of Health Care Delivery  See above plus professional 
organizations 
See above plus professional 
organizations and consumer 
organizations  
Source: based on Kirkman-Liff 1991; Centraal Planbureau 1997 
We try to assess how the actors, incentives and instruments of the model may fit to the real world in 
both countries. There are several important differences between the model and the status quo both in 
Germany and the Netherlands. The market actors consist of insurers, providers and consumers. 
There is no sponsor, although some of the tasks of the sponsor are fulfilled by government or 
government agencies. Sickness funds are deemed to act on behalf on their insured. In Germany, 
there are several agencies that monitor sickness funds in order to prevent risk selection. In both 
countries, competition authorities try to prevent anti-competitive behavior and consumer organizations 
gather information for consumers in order compare sickness funds. However, the enrollment process 
is managed by the sickness funds themselves. There is no central purchasing agent similar to the 
sponsor in the managed competition model. 
In spite of strong similarities of the basic features of the health care system in both countries (see 
Table 4), there are also important differences. First, sickness funds in Germany bear a higher risk for 24 
their expenses. In theory, they are fully responsible for their losses; in practice there is quite a high 
volume of transfers between branches of sickness funds.24 In the Netherlands, sickness funds have 
to bear only 35 percent of their financial risk. Equally important, secondly market access especially for 
physicians is much more difficult in the Netherlands than in Germany. In Germany, the right to choose 
a profession is part of the constitution. In contrast, it is very difficult to become general physician or 
even specialist in the Netherlands.25 With regard to other incentives of managed competition, they 
are more developed in the Netherlands. Sickness funds are budgeted by a system of risk-adjusted 
capitation payments. The formula for risk-adjustment is more comprehensive than in Germany and 
has been improved significantly since its first implementation.26 In both countries there is a 
standardized benefits package for consumers, but market access for insurers is much better in the 
Netherlands than in Germany. Both countries try to implement effective competition policy in health 
care, the Netherlands have established a competition agency which is very eager fight anti-
competitive behavior of providers and insurers. Free choice of insurers for consumers is limited in 
Germany, while there are no limits in the Netherlands.27 Cost-sharing for consumers is evident in 
both countries, although the degree still is very small. 
                                                        
24 For example, almost every state (Land) in Germany has one Ortskrankenkasse (local sickness fund or AOK), 
which is legally separate from the AOK in other states. However, especially AOKs in western states do support AOKs 
in eastern states who have to fight high premiums and high deficits. Without this cross-subsidization some AOKs 
were bankrupt. 
25 Barriers range from tough ceilings on the number of students that are implemented by government to limited 
access to specialized education which is a domain of physician organizations. Both actors used to be interested in 
tight capacities. Now, the government tries to increase capacities, while the physician associations are still very 
reluctant to do the same. 
26 There are even plans to include diagnostic information in order to increase the predictive value of the formula 
even more. 
27 Especially sickness funds established by employers are not required to open enrollment for non-employees in 
Germany. In the Netherlands, they are. 25 
Table 5: Actors, Incentives and Instruments of Managed Competition in the Model, in Germany 
and in the Netherlands 
 MC  Model  Germany  Netherlands 
Financial risk for insurers  High  Medium  Medium to Low 
Risk-adjusted capitation for 
insurers 
Refined   Coarse  Slightly Refined 
Standardized basic benefits 
package for consumers 
Yes  Yes, but very high level  Yes, but high level 
Free market access for 
providers  
Yes Limited No 
Free market access for 
insurers 
Yes No Yes   
Sponsor Yes  No  No 
Effective competition policy  Yes No  Starting  up 
Free choice of sickness 
fund for consumers 
Yes Mostly Yes 
Cost-sharing for consumers  High Medium Low 
Price competition insurers  High  High  Low 
Price competition providers  High  Zero  Almost Zero 
Competition on the range of 
services insurers 
High Almost  Zero Low 
Selective contracting of 
providers 
Possible  Almost impossible  Possible only for self-
employed professionals 
Vertical integration of 
insurers and providers 
Possible  Impossible  Only for pharmacies 
With regard to instruments of managed competition, both countries have significant deficits, although 
in separate areas. In Germany, there is very strong price competition between insurers, since the 
income-dependent premium is determined by each sickness fund individually and differs from 11.2 
percent to 14.9 percent of gross income.28 Assuming an average income of 2500 Euro a month, the 
difference between the lowest possible premium and the highest possible premium amounts to more 
than 1000 Euro annually. Since the income-dependent premium in the Netherlands is fixed, only the 
nominal premium is determined by individual sickness funds. Premium differences amount to around 
50 Euro annually. Accordingly, in Germany around tree to five percent of all insured change their 
sickness fund every year. Estimations in the Netherlands range under one percent.  
However, managed competition in Germany is also lopsided competition. Prices and volumes of 
services are still determined collectively and sickness funds are not allowed to contract with individual 
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not only due to differences in administrative efficiency but primarily due to incomplete risk-adjustment. 26 
providers. Vertical integration of insurers and providers is prohibited legally and sickness funds are 
not allowed to offer supplementary insurance. In contrast, Dutch sickness funds formally have more 
possibilities to act competitively. They are allowed to contract selectively with individual providers 
such as physicians and physiotherapists. Price competition between providers is possible, although 
there are maximum tariffs. Sickness funds are able to offer supplementary insurance via private 
insurers they cooperate with quite closely. 
4.3 Policy Consequences  
After comparing the institutional status quo of managed competition in Germany with the 
requirements of the model and after taking into account the experiences of managed competition in 
the Netherlands we derive the following policy consequences. The application of these consequences 
assumes that after major adjustment allowing for the context of social health insurance Enthoven’s 
managed competition model is a viable concept for the reform of European social health insurance 
systems.  
Experience in the Netherlands has shown that managed competition not necessarily has to include a 
sponsor as an additional market actor. However, there have to be institutions that have to take over 
tasks ascribed to the sponsor. In a European context, these institutions often are already existent. It 
remains to be seen if the enrollment process can be conducted by the sickness funds themselves or if 
an intermediary institution should manage it. This probably depends on the extent of direct risk 
selection strategies funds apply during the enrollment process. In the Netherlands, these strategies 
were almost non-existent. Furthermore, experience in Germany shows that self-selection by 
consumers induced by marketing strategies of the insurers is an important reason for switching to 
another fund. This behavior cannot and probably even should not be influenced by a sponsor. It is 
more important to have an efficient and effective mechanism for risk adjustment. 
Without effective risk adjustment incentives for competitive behavior of insurers are incomplete. 
Comparative advantages should be a result of efficient management of administrative resources and 
of the health field itself, not of a good risk structure. This problem is relevant especially in Germany. A 
step-by-step improvement of the risk adjustment system is a prerequisite for the successful 
implementation of managed competition. This conclusion is supported by extensive research in the 
Netherlands and plans to include diagnostic information into the formula for risk adjustment. 
Following the implementation of effective risk adjustment, sickness funds have to be responsible for 
their financial risk. This is a very powerful incentive to increase competitive pressure. For Germany, in 
the long run this results in the end of cross-subsidization between sickness funds. In the Netherlands, 
the share of expenses sickness funds are responsible has to be increased significantly. Of course, full 
financial risk also means full responsibility for contracts with providers. Sickness funds in both 
countries have to be able to influence price, quantity and quality of health services. Accordingly, 
collective contracts with all providers in Germany (ambulatory and stationary care in theory and in 27 
practice) and with most providers in the Netherlands (ambulatory care not in theory but in practice 
and stationary care in theory and in practice) have to be abolished. Even formal integration between 
insurers and providers is an option.  
Other important prerequisites of managed competition consist of a standardized benefit package for 
consumers, of unrestricted choice between insurers for consumers, of free market access for 
providers and consumers and of effective competition policy. We consider it unlikely that in Germany, 
Holland or other countries with a long tradition in social health insurance there will be political support 
for a drastic reduction in entitlement by delisting. However, there is rapid growth of new health 
technologies and the borderlines between medical care, social support and technologies aimed to 
improve the quality of life are fading. Such innovations may add to the growth of supplementary 
insurance if insurers are willing to offer coverage to interested consumers. Further, a systematic 
application of scientific knowledge to medical practice such as medical technology assessment and 
related activities may reveal that the cost effectiveness of current practices is too low to justify 
collective funding. Next, increasing consumer incomes and consumer expectations may create new 
demand for health-related goods and services (Light 2000). If the current sickness funds are allowed 
to expand their activities beyond the traditional borders of social health insurance, they have an 
incentive to be more creative.  
5  Discussion: Costs and Benefits of Managed Competition 
Obviously, a consistent reform of both the Dutch and the German health care systems following the 
policy consequences formulated above is a quite extensive enterprise. It requires a careful analysis of 
the probable reactions of the political players in the health field and their possible anticipative 
behavior. Implementation and maintenance of managed competition is an enormous challenge for 
regulation and policy makers. That is why in this last section of our article we try to speculate about 
possible costs and benefits of implementing managed competition in Germany and the Netherlands. 
Potential benefits of managed competition for the Dutch and the German health care system first 
consist of an increase of allocative efficiency by a stronger consideration of consumer preferences. 
Second, of competitive pressure on insurers and providers supposedly leads to higher administrative 
efficiency and to more value for money in health services. Third, decisions about new investments in 
the health care system are improved because market actors have to take into account real costs. This 
is a prerequisite for increased dynamic efficiency. Ideally, even responsibility for cost control can be 
shifted from government to market actors. At the same time regulation by government, government-
like agencies or a sponsor makes sure that broad access to health services is maintained and that 
risk selection by market actors is avoided. 
Possible costs of managed competition for the Dutch and the German health care system are 
implementation costs, costs of regulation and transaction costs. Experience in the Netherlands has 28 
shown that the implementation of managed competition is a lengthy and technically complex process. 
Especially the definition and implementation of the risk-adjustment formula and of the basic standard 
package proved to be more difficult than expected. Political opposition to several parts of the original 
reform plans made it necessary to change several key reform elements. Anticipative reactions of 
market actors made it necessary to adjust regulation frequently.  
Obviously, costs of implementation and regulation are the higher, the more anticipative reactions and 
political opposition occurs. Since a transformation to managed competition threatens the power and 
market positions of many actors, these kind of costs can be expected to be quite high. The amount of 
transaction costs in managed competition obviously is higher than in a system dominated by 
collective contracts between insurers and providers.29 Sickness funds have to invest heavily into 
contract management and quality monitoring. Experience in the Netherlands shows that providers are 
reluctant to contract individually if they have good working relationships with fellow physicians. 
Transaction costs of providers probably would be lower in Germany, since most physicians work 
individually rather than in groups.  
It is probably impossible to state a prognosis if costs or benefits of managed competition would be 
higher in both countries examined. There are three arguments that point toward a situation where 
costs would be higher than benefits. First, there are some serious theoretical deficiencies within 
Enthoven’s model with regard to economic foundation. Second, the model never has been 
implemented fully and successfully. Finally, costs are quite certain to occur while benefits seem to be 
more remote. On the other hand, policy makers and policy advisers in both countries feel to have a 
lack of alternatives, since regulation by government proved to be not very successful. More 
importantly, experience with the implementation and regulation of managed competition grows 
constantly while more countries try to implement their version of the model. If policy makers can use 
these experiences in the Dutch and the German institutional context, the success of managed 
competition depends on the ability and on the willingness of market actors to increase the ratio 
between benefits and transaction costs. This process will take some time, even when applying a very 
optimistic scenario. 
                                                        
29 Of course there are also transaction costs for consumers when they decide about switching to another sickness 
fund (gathering information, comparing premiums and services, writing letters, etc.).  29 
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